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Airstrikes, Proxy Warfare, and Civilian Casualties in Libya

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Key Findings

Recent developments in Libya from June 2018 through February 2020:

- Since 2012, there have been 4,349 air, drone, and artillery strikes recorded in Libya, 1,863 of those have taken place since June 2018. In the last 20 months, more than half of all strikes have taken place, yielding between 333 civilian deaths, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 467, taking the highest estimate.

- **Reported civilian deaths from airstrikes in Libya have increased considerably since June 2018.** However, the United States’ contribution to these numbers is relatively low. Civilian fatality numbers are far less than those of the U.S. air campaigns in Yemen and Pakistan conflicts, and closer to the known civilian recorded fatalities in Somalia.

- According to news reports and accounts on social media, at least 611 civilians were killed in all strikes by all belligerents since 2012, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 899 killed, by the highest estimate; and at least 1,820 total individuals (including combatants and unknown) were killed, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 2,440 by the highest estimate.

- In addition to civilian fatalities, according to news reports and individual accounts on social media, at least 871 civilians were wounded in airstrikes, by the lowest estimate, and 1,384, taking the highest estimate.

- Between 2012 and 2018, the highest number of strikes were recorded in 2016, with 1,015 conducted. This was in part due to the 2016 U.S. military operation targeting ISIS that involved 495 air and drone strikes on the city of Sirte. **However, in 2019, more than 1,600 strikes were conducted, or 25 percent of all strikes recorded since 2012.**

- **Most strikes in 2019 occurred in Tripoli—1,087 individual strikes—followed by Misrata and Jabal al Gharbi (outside Tripoli). Between September 2012 and June 2018, most strikes reportedly occurred in Benghazi, Sirte, and Derna,** cities that were high-conflict zones during the Libyan rebellion and the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention. ISIS controlled territory in both Derna and Sirte in 2015 and 2016, contributing to high volumes of strikes in those locations.
The proxy warfare effect in Libya:

- **General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has reportedly conducted at least 2,348 airstrikes in Libya since 2014—more than any other belligerent.** Haftar’s ability to attract foreign backing has amplified the LNA’s military capabilities. With assistance (in varying degrees) from countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, and Russia, the LNA accounts for more than one-half of all strikes and more than one-third of civilian deaths as well as one-third of overall deaths, highlighting its increasingly aggressive strategy to take over western Libya. Strikes by the LNA reportedly resulted in 214 civilian deaths at a minimum and potentially as many as 356 noncombatant deaths, based on the highest estimates.

- An important feature of the conflict in Libya post-2011 has been the rise of airstrikes by multiple domestic and international belligerents. **At least seven foreign countries and three domestic Libyan factions are reported to have conducted air and drone strikes in Libya since 2012.** Some strike allegations report different parties as responsible for the same strike (e.g., a local report might claim the LNA conducted a strike, while an international outlet reported that Egypt was responsible for the same action).

- Turkey entered the conflict in 2019, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) by reportedly conducting airstrikes as well as sending soldiers from Syria; and Chad conducted a helicopter strike in 2018 along its border with Libya. Both countries have more than 1,000 combatant foot soldiers each in Libya.

- The United Arab Emirates, which conducts actions in support of the LNA, has reportedly conducted **at least 131 strikes in Libya, which have resulted in at least 135 and potentially as many as 185 civilian deaths.**

- Egypt also conducts strikes alongside the LNA, as well as unilateral actions against suspected militants on its borders. At least **42 strikes have been declared or reported, which have resulted in at least 13 and at most 14 civilian deaths,** according to local and international sources.

- **France has reportedly conducted at least five strikes in Libya since 2012, which have resulted in a minimum of four and potentially as many as eight civilian deaths.** France might also be responsible for seven strikes in 2018, likely conducted with the coordination of the LNA.

- According to our data, **the United States has conducted 550 strikes on ISIS targets in Libya since the NATO intervention,** primarily against
ISIS in Sirte in 2016, which according to Libyan reports resulted in 11 to 21 civilian fatalities, based on the minimum and maximum estimates in our database.
Glossary of Belligerents

Aerial Conflict Belligerents in Libya

Foreign Belligerents Conduction Air/Drone/Artillery Strikes through February 2020

- The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** and Egypt reportedly launched airstrikes during “Operation Dawn” in August 2014, and the UAE provides military support to General Khalifa Haftar’s LNA by conducting airstrikes in cooperation with them. The first strikes by the UAE took place in 2014 from an Egyptian air base. The UAE is known for its regional interventions that protest political Islam while promoting a version that supports its ideals. The UAE conducted three strikes in 2019 and one strike in 2020. Counting any additional strikes in accordance with the LNA, the UAE has had as many as 70 additional strikes between 2019 and 2020.

- **Turkey**’s first alleged airstrike in Libya occurred on July 14, 2019 in Tripoli. Reports indicate Turkey’s air campaign continued for the rest of 2019, striking Libya seven times. Turkey likely conducted an additional 10 strikes with the GNA. Seven of those total strikes occurred in Tripoli. Turkey began sending troops to Libya in January 2020 after the Turkish Parliament voted to support and train the GNA and affiliates. This came after Turkey and Libya signed formal economic agreements at the end of 2019. A government official from Turkey told New America via email that Turkish personnel are there to provide advisory and training services to GNA troops. Through February 5, 2020, Turkey has allegedly conducted airstrikes by itself three times and likely in coordination with the GNA twice.

- The **United States** led the NATO intervention in 2011. The military participated in an aerial campaign against the Gaddafi regime, and conducted at least 550 airstrikes in Libya with the consent of the GNA since 2012. Since June 2018, the United States has conducted an additional 11 strikes. The United States continues to conduct airstrikes in Libya against ISIS and al-Qaeda.

- **France** was actively involved in the 2011 NATO intervention. At various points over the last several years, France publicly stated its support of a democratic process and constitution building, but it’s possible that supplying weapons and/or aircrafts to the LNA was antithetical to that process. France also hosted discussions at its Libya Summit in 2018, pushing for elections in Libya. Fast-forward to July 2019, the BBC reported...
that there were French missiles on a pro-Haftar military base. France reportedly conducted seven strikes likely in coordination with the LNA in 2018, but New America and Airwars have not recorded any additional strikes since then.

- **Egypt** became involved in the Libyan conflict in August 2014 by providing its military bases to the United Arab Emirates for launching strikes in Libya. Egypt first conducted its own strikes in neighboring Libya in February 2015 in response to ISIS’s beheading of Egyptian Coptic Christians. Egypt backs the LNA, and worked closely with the UAE in “Operation Dawn” in August 2014. Egypt’s latest strike was in February 2019, but had been more active in years prior.

- **Chad** conducted one helicopter strike along its border with Libya in 2018. No other strikes were reported. There are over 1,000 Chadian combatants in Libya across the country, supporting at least four groups. Some of these individuals are linked to killing, kidnappings, and robberies against southern Libyans.

- **Italy** was a significant participant in the NATO intervention, in particular, because it permitted the use of its air bases, as well as conducted strikes early on. The United States launches drones from the Naval Air Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy. Italy may have conducted one strike with the GNA in August 2018, although it is contested. The LNA shot down an Italian drone in 2019, mistaking it for a Turkish model.

Local Belligerents

- **General National Congress (GNC)** On July 7, 2012, Libya’s congressional elections took place, the first since 1969. These elections created the General National Congress (GNC), a government projected to oversee the country for 18 months while a new constitution and parliamentary elections were implemented. The GNC decided to extend their term, which frustrated Haftar to the point of declaring the dissolution of the GNC in February 2014. By May 2014, Haftar’s coup attempt called “Operation Dignity” began—with the intention of eradicating radical Islamists from Benghazi—leading to elections the following month, and Islamists who once ruled the government were sorely defeated. The conflict between the GNC and the House of Representatives began to spiral out of control, even after both sides agreed to end the conflict. By April 2016, the GNA took over as the new government.
• **Government of National Accord (GNA)** In April 2016, the GNA took over as the governing body in Libya, but remained contested by the opposing faction led by Haftar, the Libyan National Army (LNA). The GNA currently governs out of Tripoli, and is led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The GNA is backed by the United Nations (UN) as the sole legitimate government in Libya, as well as by a number of international supporters.

• **Libyan National Army (LNA)** The LNA is led by Haftar, and rules its House of Representatives in the eastern city of Tobruk. The LNA currently holds territory in more than two-thirds of Libya. The LNA is backed by numerous international belligerents, and is becoming increasingly aggressive in its attempts to take over western Libya.

**Figure 1:**

Drone/Air/Artillery strike locations before and after June 1, 2018

Larger dots indicate larger numbers of strikes
Introduction: An Overview of the Air Campaigns in Libya

Like so many months before, June 6, 2018 began with a thunderous airstrike that hit the town of Bani Walid in northwest Libya, about 100 miles from Tripoli, a town that used to be considered “Libya’s last stronghold loyal to Muammar Gaddafi.” A press release by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) stated that four ISIS-Libya combatants died and no civilians were harmed. However, local reporting with photographic evidence, also confirmed by the UN, stated that the same strike had killed three civilians driving in the car with the UN-designated terrorist. Local television network Libya Alaan tweeted, translated from Arabic, “#Libya_now A nightly raid on #Bani_Walid that resulted in the death of 6 people, including a prominent leader of the Islamic State # ISIS ‘Abd al-Ati Eshtiwi Abu Sita’, known as ‘Kiwi.’”

Earlier that same week, the local news outlet Libya Observer reported that Africa Intelligence alleged that France had provided General Khalifa Haftar with a reconnaissance aircraft; French missiles sold to them by the United States were also found in a Libyan National Army (LNA) camp. France publicly stated its support of a democratic process and constitution building, but the possible supplying of weapons and/or aircrafts to the LNA was antithetical to that process. France also hosted discussions at its Libya Summit on May 29, 2018, pushing for elections in Libya. Fast-forward to July 2019, the BBC reported there were French missiles on a pro-Haftar military base.

On June 16, 2018, the LNA struck the town of Ra’s Lanuf, a coastal city about 400 miles from Tripoli. Between one and three civilians were killed that day, two of them children. Ra’s Lanuf was hit the next three days, and at least another two civilians were killed. That June, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that there were at least 31 civilian casualties that month throughout Libya, 16 of which were deaths.

Since the beginning of summer 2018, there have been many similar incidents. According to New America and Airwars data, the strike count in Libya is 1,863 from June 1, 2018 through February 5, 2020 and between 333 and 467 civilians have been killed. One of the worst hit areas is Tripoli, which was struck over 1,200 times. When Haftar was unable to gain control of Tripoli, which has been part of his plan for years, he looked for the next best thing, the surrounding coastal cities of Misrata and Sirte, as well Jabal al Gharbi, a district near Tripoli. According to New America and Airwars data, each of those cities was struck more than 100 times during the same period.

New America and Airwars have documented more than 4,300 airstrikes reportedly conducted between September 2012 and February 5, 2020 in Libya,
which resulted in at least 611 civilian deaths using the low-end estimate, and as many as 899 civilian deaths using the high-end estimate. There are more than 10 international states actively contributing to the conflict in one form or another. Turkey, Chad, and Italy each reportedly conducted at least one airstrike since June 2018. Various open source reports show that Russia, Jordan, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia support the LNA either with financing or by providing weapons, and Qatar financially backs the Government of National Accord (GNA).\textsuperscript{13} A Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan official source told New America before the release of this report that Jordan has not financially backed or provided any military resources or training in Libya. Furthermore, the official source said Jordan abides by United Nations arms embargoes, respects the territorial sovereignty of Libya, and rejects foreign intervention in Libya. Lastly, the source said, Jordan, as a manufacturer of military weapons, expects its buyers to not resell them in Libya. France, Egypt, and the United States are involved in various capacities (from weapons support to deploying airstrikes); however, the most alarming turn of events since 2018 are the recent alleged strikes by Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Turkey entered the conflict in July 2019 with an airstrike that allegedly killed one civilian. Six months later, they sent 2,000 Syrian troops to support the GNA. In an email to New America, a government official from the Turkish Embassy/Defence Office in Washington, D.C. said that Turkish personnel are in Libya at the request of the GNA as a result of their collective signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Turkey and the GNA on November 27, 2019 for security and military cooperation. Further, the official said that Turkish personnel are in Libya to provide advisory and training services to the GNA, and Turkey has not carried out any airstrikes in Libya because all weapons, systems and vehicles are operated by Libyans. Reported strikes by the UAE in coordination with the LNA have contributed to over 100 civilian fatalities since June 2018. The 1,863 strikes since June 2018 account for more than half the number of civilian casualties throughout the entire conflict. The LNA’s more aggressive approach indicates that Haftar and his supporters are willing to indiscriminately kill civilians as he attempts to take over the capital. This increased danger has caused a mass exodus from various cities throughout Libya.

As a result, according to UN estimates, at least 823,000 people\textsuperscript{14} are in need of various humanitarian aid; there are at least 355,672\textsuperscript{15} internally displaced people; and there are 47,079\textsuperscript{16} registered refugees and asylum seekers due to the ongoing conflict across Libya. These high numbers of people face significant risks as they look for asylum. According to a UN report on children and armed conflict, “refugee and migrant children were reportedly subjected to sexual abuse, including forced prostitution and sexual exploitation, in conditions that could amount to sexual slavery, by traffickers or criminal networks allegedly associated with armed groups.”\textsuperscript{17} Those conditions are in addition to UN reporting on child and youth recruitment by belligerents in the conflict.\textsuperscript{18} Families are not only
attempting to escape for safety concerns, but also fear unprecedented economic instability.

With oil production down, and petroleum exports accounting for nearly 70 percent \(^1\) of all of Libya’s exports, the country is continuing to rapidly decline. Haftar’s affiliates have blocked oil fields and export terminals at airports \(^2\) since January 18, 2020, which has drastically further limited production. Crude oil production has reportedly fallen to 163,684 barrels per day; Prime Minister al-Sarraj believes the loss in revenue due to the blockade is USD $1.4 billion and growing. \(^3\) Since Haftar’s Tripoli offensive in April 2019, growth in Libya’s GDP has reduced by 66.6 percent. \(^4\)

Society in parts of Libya is deteriorating. Benghazi and other eastern Libyan towns cope with constant tension, blackouts that last half the day, \(^5\) fear of bombings, possible abductions of family members, \(^6\) attacks on women, and abductions of bank employees and administrators. Benghazi has become a central trading point for drugs and arms sales. \(^7\) Across the country, there are disappearances and torture of individuals deemed by the opposing sides as dangerous. For example, The Independent reported in 2019 that during the fight for Derna, LNA affiliates allegedly committed war crimes, with actions described as “instances of torture, murder and mutilation of corpses.” \(^8\) Since Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, more than 60 attacks on healthcare facilities, workers, and/or ambulances have occurred according to UN reports. \(^9\) These attacks indicate Haftar and his affiliates’ willingness to arbitrarily attack civilians if it means geographic gains in LNA territory.

New America and Airwars have documented more than 4,300 airstrikes reportedly conducted between September 2012 and February 5, 2020 in Libya, which resulted in at least 611 civilian deaths using the low-end estimate, and as many as 899 civilian deaths using the high-end estimate.

Some international organizations continue to attempt to produce an accurate death toll of civilians in Libya and identify the responsible parties. However, a lack of reporting and self-reporting of strikes has enabled those responsible to often go unnoticed. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
consistently provides figures for civilian casualties of the hostilities in Libya. However, according to its press releases, UNSMIL is sometimes unable to “determine with certainty” which parties contributed to the casualties, with the exception of the Libyan National Army. Human Rights Watch at times reports casualties from “unidentified aircraft,” due to an inability to identify the party responsible. With some exceptions, no belligerents typically claim responsibility for these airstrikes or their outcomes.

New America and Airwars have found 4,349 reported airstrikes in Libya from September 2012 to February 5, 2020, as seen in Figures 2 and 3. As outlined in the methodology section, on-the-ground reports were collected from a wide variety of sources. Because this study seeks to fill gaps in English-language reporting on civilian casualties in Libya, many of the sources are in Arabic.

Strikes in this report include allegations of civilian casualties by the following parties: Libya’s GNA, which is recognized by the UN; the LNA, a rival military force led by Haftar; Egypt; the United Arab Emirates; France; Turkey; Chad; Italy; and the United States. Various open source reports show that Russia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar have either financially backed and/or provided troops to either warring side—GNA and LNA.

→ UNDERSTANDING THE NEW AMERICA-AIRWARS METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of this data collection project, as well as “Airstrikes and Civilian Casualties in Libya: Since the 2011 NATO Intervention,” which was released in June 2018, we are an all-source monitor. This methodology has not changed, and continues to be described as follows:

When documenting potential civilian deaths from airstrikes, we draw upon a wide range of materials. These include reports from international and local news agencies and nongovernmental organizations, as well as social media sites such as local resident groups, Facebook pages, YouTube footage of incidents, and local tweets relating to specific events, to name a few. This project seeks to fill gaps in English-language reporting on civilian casualties in Libya. As a result, the vast majority of our sources are in the Arabic language.

These individual sources and links are compiled into a large and evolving event archive on the Airwars website, and data sheets are available on both the New America and Airwars websites. In the data review process, the collated material received a grade from an English-language assessor to determine the likely credibility of the allegation.
Because of wide variations in the quality of casualty reporting, for this project we employed the following grading system for events alleging airstrikes with noncombatant victims:

- **Confirmed:** An international or local belligerent has accepted responsibility for the killing or injuring of noncombatants or allied forces in a particular incident.

- **Fair:** There is reporting of an alleged incident from two or more credible sources (often coupled with biographical, photographic and/or video evidence). Crucially, there are also well-reported military strikes in the near vicinity for the date in question. We believe these cases in particular require urgent investigation.

- **Weak:** There is reporting of an alleged incident from only one credible source. These often feature biographical details of victims along with photographic evidence from a reputable source. There are also reported airstrikes in the near vicinity for the date in question.

- **Contested Events:** Incidents that involve competing claims for the origins of a violent incident (i.e., aircraft from two different countries/forces are reported as responsible for a single attack).

- **Discounted:** Cases where our researchers or accused actors can demonstrate that those killed were in fact combatants, or that an incident likely did not result in any civilian casualties.
The Conflicts in Libya from 2011-2020

The NATO Intervention in 2011

Weeks after the uprising against Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011, the International Criminal Court, the World Health Organization, and the UN declared civilians were at heightened risk. UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (February 2011) passed in an attempt to maintain some semblance of structure before the country collapsed. It called for an arms embargo, a travel ban, and asset freeze on Gaddafi’s family and affiliates. However, Gaddafi continued his violent, unflinching campaign in pursuit of defeating various rebel groups across Libya until the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 (March 2011) to protect civilians in grave danger.

In support of the UN resolution, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom participated in an air campaign against the Libyan government and military targets associated with Gaddafi. In total, 18 countries participated in the NATO intervention in Libya. France and the United States coordinated surveillance in a joint operation to locate Gaddafi, who was attempting to escape the city of Sirte on October 21, 2011. A French aircraft struck his convoy, and then rebel fighters killed him. Despite pleas from the interim government for NATO to remain in Libya until the close of 2011, the UN voted to end the international intervention. NATO closed its mission on October 31, 2011. Libya was then left to its own devices.

2011-2020: The Endless Civil War

Interim Government

The National Transitional Council (NTC) became the acting government at the close of the NATO intervention in October 2011. The NTC governed with the intention of establishing the future government of Libya, and was led by acting Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril. The NTC designed a plan to create an 18-month transition, but was so weak that the minimal structure it was able to implement began to unravel. Corruption and extortion from militant groups established a dangerous precedent for those wishing to obtain government jobs.

On July 7, 2012, Libya’s parliamentary elections took place, the first since 1969. These elections created the General National Congress (GNC), a government projected to oversee the country for 18 months while a new constitution and parliamentary elections were completed. The design for parliamentary seats included proportional representation of Islamists, including Salafists and the
Muslim Brotherhood; the moderate National Forces Alliance affiliated with Mahmoud Jibril; and independents.  

The GNC, which never effectively governed Libya, forced the passing of the 2013 Political Isolation Law. This law prevented large populations across the country from holding segments of the government should they have previous Gaddafi allegiance.  The GNC was set to end its term in February 2014, but decided to extend past the agreed upon date, despite pushback from the public.  Haftar, frustrated by this announcement, declared the dissolution of the GNC that February, and by May 2014 his coup attempt called “Operation Dignity”—with the intention of eradicating radical Islamists from Benghazi—began.  Elections took place in June 2014, and Islamists who once ruled the government were sorely defeated. Voter turnout represented less than half of those eligible to vote, and a number of deaths resulted from continued armed conflict.  The outcome was the creation of the House of Representatives in eastern Libya. In July, Operation Libya Dawn began in support of the outgoing GNC. This militia-based operation prevented the House of Representatives from taking power in Tripoli, so they formed in the eastern city of Tobruk. By November, Libya’s Supreme Court ruled that the House of Representatives was illegitimate. The conflict between the GNC and House of Representatives continued to spiral out of control, creating the two governments Libya is managing today—that of the UN-backed government and that of Haftar. Each has its own parliament, militia, and ties to the Central Bank.  

Since then, many international diplomatic interventions have attempted to create a ceasefire and establish a functioning democratic electoral process. Each international Libya Summit since 2018 has called for fair elections. However, each time a possible date is set, it is delayed again. The most recent Berlin Summit called for the creation of an International Follow-Up Committee (IFC), which would meet regularly to continue the dialogue from the Summit and support the peace process.

Civil War, Airstrikes, and International Intervention

In April 2016, the GNA took over as the new government after more than a year of civil unrest, and was still contested by Haftar’s LNA. These dire circumstances forced the international backing of either side. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States all began conducting air/drone/artillery strikes on behalf of the GNA or LNA and/or actively targeting Islamist militants. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom were all actively involved in the mediation process that helped to create the GNA. The United States conducted at least 550 airstrikes in Libya with the consent of the GNA since 2012, resulting in at least 11 and potentially as many as 21 publicly reported civilian fatalities. Most occurred during the U.S.-led Sirte campaign in 2016, but since June 2018, the United States conducted an additional 11 strikes. Only one of those 11 has resulted in possible civilian casualties.
The LNA is responsible for over one-half of all air, drone, and artillery strikes that have occurred since 2012, and is responsible for more than one-third of civilian deaths and one-third of overall deaths.

The LNA and GNA each receive support from various countries, which has created an aggressive proxy conflict in Libya. Some provide financial support, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but others provide weapons and foot soldiers, such as the UAE (in support of the LNA) and Turkey (in support of the GNA). Those who provide weapons have each participated in deadly strikes, fueling the narrative of each side. For example, on July 3, 2019, the UAE bombed a migrant center in Tripoli, killing at least 53 civilians, and then on August 4, 2019 they bombed the city of Murzuq, allegedly targeting combatants from the Chadian opposition. That strike killed another 42 or more civilians. On July 26, the GNA struck the key LNA airbase Al Jufra by Turkish drone, which destroyed two cargo planes and killed a mercenary pilot from Ukraine. The next day, the LNA targeted a drone control room, as well as the Air Force Academy in Misrata, which was an area of the country that had been somewhat untouched, compared to Tripoli, Benghazi, or Sirte, for example. Enough Turkish drones were destroyed in airstrikes that summer by the UAE that they had to be constantly moved around in a desperate attempt at deterrence.

The recent increase in violence stemmed from Haftar’s April 2019 Tripoli offensive, when the LNA declared they would head “to the western region to cleanse it of the remaining terrorist groups” in “Operation Flood of Dignity.” On April 5, the second day of the offensive, UN Secretary-General António Guterres flew to Benghazi to meet with Haftar—after meeting with al-Sarraj and visiting Ain Zara Detention Center to meet with refugees and migrants—implored him to rethink his incursion, particularly because the war had gone on for so many years. At the end of their meeting and without a promise from Haftar to end the strikes or commit to a ceasefire, Guterres left Libya, concerned for its future. Then Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, dubbed Haftar’s call for al-Serraj’s arrest by Haftar a coup attempt. Salamé had plans for a national reconciliation conference in mid-April 2019 but had to postpone it after the LNA and GNA conducted 30 airstrikes each.

Prior to April 2019, air attacks on Tripoli were relatively few in comparison to those on Benghazi, Sirte, or Derna. After all, the LNA only has 25,000 fighters.
(7,000 are Army members, and the remainder are from militias, international mercenaries, or Salafist fighters) which is five times the number of soldiers the GNA has.\textsuperscript{66} ISIS, at its height, ensnared Derna,\textsuperscript{67} but lost the city in 2016, similar to Sirte. However, Haftar has long claimed that the intent of the LNA campaign across the country was to battle ISIS and other radical Islamists. By the time he attacked Derna in 2019, the city was still in recovery from ISIS occupation three years prior.

Tripoli has been one of the hardest hit cities in all of Libya throughout the conflict. Most strikes between June 2018 and February 5, 2020 took place in Tripoli, with over 1,200 individual strikes resulting in nearly 400 deaths. Outside of Tripoli, more than 300 additional people died during that timeframe. Throughout 2019, the LNA conducted 910 strikes; 890 of those took place during Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, which resulted in between 62 and 93 civilian deaths. The GNA conducted 336 strikes during that same timeframe, 204 of which were in Tripoli. These strikes yielded between 38 and 53 civilian deaths, which is more than half of all civilian deaths by the GNA since 2012.

The LNA and GNA continue to accuse each other of wreaking havoc across Libya; they remain caught in a vicious cycle of violence that vindicates their respective actions against the other. Since 2012, the LNA has reportedly conducted at least 2,348 airstrikes, killing between 214 and 356 civilians. The GNA strike count is nowhere near that of the LNA, even with international intervention. The GNA’s 453 strikes have killed between 53 and 72 civilians.\textsuperscript{68}

**International Diplomacy Interventions: United Nations Resolutions**

February 12, 2020 marked the most recent UN Security Council Resolution (2510) to order a ceasefire. It was nearly passed unanimously, with Russia abstaining instead of voting it down. The resolution focused on supporting the continuing UNSMIL, as well as the promises made at the Berlin Summit.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, the resolution emphasized the security council’s ongoing concerns of terrorist activity in the country, intervening mercenaries, and the need for significant ongoing humanitarian aid.

UN talks held in early February 2020 in Geneva, Switzerland showed promise, according to Salamé.\textsuperscript{70} The Libya Joint Military Commission, or 5+5 talks as they are commonly known, allow for representation from both the GNA and LNA, at the decision of al-Sarraj and Haftar. The 5+5 includes selected representatives from both the LNA and GNA.

Al-Sarraj last spoke at the United Nations during the 74th session of the UN General Assembly gathering in September 2019.\textsuperscript{71} He addressed the General Assembly with an update on the status of the war in Libya, and pleaded with the international community to recognize what he referred to as war crimes by Haftar and the LNA, the targeting of hospitals, airports, bombing of
neighborhoods, and child recruitment. He highlighted that this conflict has yielded 3,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, stating, “No one wins in a military conflict, and only Libya loses.” He asked the International Criminal Court to investigate the allegations against Haftar, as well as asked the UN to complete a fact-finding mission, particularly after the April 2019 attempted overtake of Libya’s capital city Tripoli.

See Appendix A for a full list of Security Council Resolutions on Libya since June 2018.

→ RECENT DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION ATTEMPTS

**The Istanbul and Moscow Summits**

Within a week of Turkey sending troops to Libya in support of the GNA, representatives from Russia and Turkey met in Istanbul in early January 2020, calling for a ceasefire between rival factions, the LNA and GNA. Diplomats from both sides released a joint statement declaring a ceasefire from January 12. Simultaneously, both Haftar and al-Sarraj flew to Europe for separate meetings with European officials looking for support to end the conflict.

Later in January, representatives from the LNA and GNA met in Moscow to discuss mutually agreed upon approaches to ending the conflict. l-Sarraj and Haftar participated in a full day of “indirect talks” without meeting each other in person. Russia and Turkey attempted to broker a deal between the two parties, but after al-Sarraj signed the agreement, Haftar left Moscow without agreeing to the terms.

The two rivals convened for other notable meetings in the last two years: in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates in February 2019, hosted by Salamé; and Palermo, Italy in November 2018.

**The Berlin Summit**

On January 19, 2020, representatives from the governments of Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of the Congo, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in addition to representatives from United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and the League of Arab States, met in Berlin, Germany for the next phase of diplomatic discussion attempts to assuage the conflict in Libya. Despite representation from a number of invested governments, Haftar and al-Sarraj did not meet face-to-face to discuss the proposed agreement.
The parameters of the agreement included a ceasefire; recognition of and continued adherence to the arms embargo from 2011, which was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1970; a return to the political process focused on Libyan-owned and led operations; security sector reform; economic and financial reform, including the recognition of Libya’s National Oil Corporations as the only “legitimate oil company,” citing UN resolutions 2259 (2015) and 2441 (2018); and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights.

The participants at the Summit determined that the next step was to create an International Follow-Up Committee (IFC), which would meet regularly to continue the dialogue from the Summit and support the peace process. In addition, the proposed UNSMIL 5+5 Committee should continue as planned. The participating governments agreed that as long as the truce between the LNA and GNA is adhered to, they would “refrain from any further military deployments or operations.” Since the Summit, the GNA, with the support of Turkey, and the LNA, with the support of the UAE, as well as multiple “unknown” belligerents, have conducted strikes in Libya, the majority of which were in Tripoli and include civilian deaths.
Reported Strikes by International Belligerents

At least seven foreign countries have conducted airstrikes in Libya since 2012, highlighting the evolving proxy warfare nature of this conflict. However, the most recently active countries are the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, each fighting on behalf of local belligerents, the Libyan National Army or the Government of National Accord. The United States is absent from the list below, and is described in a later section of the report.

**Strikes by the United Arab Emirates**

In March 2011, the UAE joined a coalition of NATO countries and Arab nations that was supported by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (March 2011) to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. As a result, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was established as an 18-month long temporary government for Libya in the aftermath of the removal of Gaddafi. The UAE is known for its regional interventions, as it continues to protest political Islam while promoting a version that supports its ideals, therefore “[politicizing] the secularization of politics” to justify its geopolitical actions. Leaders in the UAE were concerned with how instability in Libya would influence them in the region, so they decided to support Haftar in his campaign against what he perceived to be radical Islamists in 2014.

The first strikes by the UAE began in 2014, taking off from an Egyptian air base. Since June 2018, the UAE has reportedly conducted three individual airstrikes, but as many as 67 in coordination with the LNA. In some cases it is not discernible whether the UAE operated independently. When the UAE conducts drone strikes, it uses Chinese Wing Loong models, which were originally designed after the MQ-1 Predators in the United States. These 67 strikes account for as many as 124 civilian deaths, taking the lowest count, and as many as 167, taking the highest count. Up until February 5, 2020, the LNA and UAE have allegedly conducted three strikes together this year, causing three civilian deaths; the UAE has conducted one strike by itself. The UAE has breached the agreed-to arms embargo in Libya after the latest Libya Summits in January 2020. New America reached out to the government of the United Arab Emirates for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response. See Figure 4 and Appendices F and M for more on strikes by the UAE.
Turkey’s first alleged airstrike in Libya occurred on July 14, 2019 in Tripoli, and targeted a house that reportedly killed one civilian. Two weeks later, outside Sirte, a similar strike occurred, this time striking a civilian vehicle, killing two people and critically injuring one child. Two months earlier, Turkey allegedly began delivering drones and other equipment to Libya, totaling USD $350 million. Reports indicate Turkey’s air campaign continued for the rest of 2019, striking Libya 10 times, in addition to the seven times it has combined efforts with the GNA. Turkey deploys its own Bayraktar TB-2 drones in Libya, compared to the Chinese drones that the UAE uses. According to New America and Airwars data, these combined strikes killed between 10 and 12 civilians in 2019. Seven of those strikes occurred in Tripoli.

Turkey began sending troops to Libya in January 2020 after the Turkish Parliament voted to support and train GNA fighters and affiliates. This came after Turkey and Libya signed formal economic agreements at the end of 2019, one of which made official new maritime boundaries between the two countries.
Turkey claims that because of these newly declared boundaries, it has access to natural gas that other neighboring states are also keen to get their hands on, especially since Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece left Turkey out of their newly formed Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The EastMed deal, as it’s commonly referred to, may be worth over USD $6.7 billion.

Turkey’s geopolitical motivations and actions are increasingly described, and criticized, as “neo-Ottoman” and expansionist, meaning Turkey may be looking to regain its sphere of influence that it claimed during the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, many international law experts are calling into question the legality of Turkey’s maritime border move, especially its attempt to lay claim to waters that should be easily accessed by the EastMed cooperative.

Before this report was published, New America corresponded via email with a government official from the Turkish Embassy/Defence Office in Washington, D.C. The government official told New America that Turkey’s main goal in Libya is to create a stable, independent and sovereign country, while respecting Libya’s territorial integrity.

The GNA entered into an agreement with Turkey to receive military support against the LNA and its backers. Some experts argued it would help balance out the support the LNA has received from the UAE. Two thousand Syrian troops were transported through Turkey to support the GNA in January 2020; however, they are not affiliated with the Turkish military, but are temporary contractors with the GNA. According to New America and Airwars data, from January 1, 2020 through February 5, 2020, Turkey conducted airstrikes by itself three times, and in coordination with the GNA twice. None of those strikes have resulted in civilian deaths. New America reached out to the government of Turkey for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response.

The Republic of Turkey government official also stated in email correspondence with New America that Turkey does not have any armed land, sea, or air force elements in Libya, and thus has not conducted any airstrikes. The Turkish personnel sent to Libya are at the request of Libya’s GNA, as indicated in their memorandum of understanding signed on November 27, 2019 for security and military cooperation. Further, Turkish personnel are there to provide advisory and training services to GNA troops, and thus has not conducted any airstrikes in Libya. All strikes are conducted by Libyans.

See Figure 5 and Appendices E and L for more on strikes by Turkey.
France publicly recognizes the GNA, and stated its support of a democratic process and constitution building during the Libya Summits it hosts, but its possible supplying of weapons and/or aircraft to the LNA conflicts with this public notion of letting local Libyans decide their future, or even supporting the UN-backed government. France reportedly provides military support to Haftar’s LNA. France provided Haftar with a reconnaissance aircraft, and French missiles sold to them by the United States were also found in an LNA camp.

France’s support for both the LNA and GNA stems from its goals in Libya that directly impact its interests in the wider region. Concerned with minimizing the threat of jihadists in Libya, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a unified national army and national government. France’s clandestine activities across the country show its preference for the LNA. France reportedly conducted seven strikes, likely in coordination with the LNA, in 2018, but New America and Airwars have not recorded any additional strikes since then. Members of French intelligence were arrested in April 2019 along the Libyan
border with Tunisia, with communications devices allegedly interconnected with the LNA.\textsuperscript{98} New America reached out to the government of France for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response. See Appendix N for more strikes by France.

\textit{Strikes by Egypt}

The Egyptian government first publicly acknowledged conducting airstrikes in Libya in February 2015. These initial strikes were in response to ISIS’s beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians.\textsuperscript{99} However, Egypt’s first role in the conflict began in August 2014. Egypt provided military bases for the UAE to launch armed planes to strike in Libya.\textsuperscript{100} On February 15, 2015, Egyptian airstrikes occurred in the Bab Shiha neighborhood and the headquarters of Jabal al-Akhdar Industrial Co. in east Derna. At least seven civilians were killed in those strikes, three or four were children.\textsuperscript{101} Egypt opted for striking Derna where ISIS had a stronghold instead of Tripolitania Province because the roundtrip distance was too far for its jets to travel without requiring refueling.\textsuperscript{102} Amnesty International reported that Egypt did not take proper precautions to protect civilians while conducting those two airstrikes.\textsuperscript{103}

According to New America and Airwars data, Egypt’s most recent strike took place in February 2019 along the Libya-Egypt border, killing eight combatants. This is the most recent known recorded strike. New America reached out to the government of Egypt for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response. See Appendix D for more strikes by Egypt.

\textit{Strikes by Italy}

Italy was a significant participant in the NATO intervention, in particular, because it permitted the use of its airbases, as well as conducted strikes early on.\textsuperscript{104} The United States launches drones from the Naval Air Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy. Italy has argued with France over France’s backing of Haftar and the LNA,\textsuperscript{105} and has tried to engage in diplomatic talks with both sides, which frustrates the LNA and GNA.\textsuperscript{106} Italy may have conducted one airstrike with the GNA in August 2018, although it is contested, and in 2019, the LNA allegedly shot down an Italian drone, mistaking it for a Turkish model. New America reached out to the government of Italy before publishing this report and received a reply that more than 400 Italian soldiers are still on the ground in Libya, and the Italian military conducts activities from the Misrata hospital center to training and assisting missions in Tripoli. Italy also supports new European Union naval and training missions in Libya. Italy has not officially acknowledged any loss of soldiers or equipment in Libya. See Appendix J for more strikes by Italy.
On September 1, 2018, Chad conducted a helicopter strike in Murzuq, killing two civilians. In February 2019, Haftar stated that the LNA had conducted airstrikes against three groups of Chadian combatants in Murzuq. France allegedly conducted strikes nearby, but it was indiscernible if the Chadian groups were the same targets for the LNA and France, or if they were located in different places. Chad is actively trying to prevent combatants in the Libya conflict from crossing into Chad, but numerous Chadian combatants are involved in the conflict, supporting either the GNA or LNA. According to a UN report at the end of 2019, there are over 1,000 Chadian combatants in Libya across the country, supporting at least four groups. Some of these individuals are linked to killing, kidnappings, and robberies against southern Libyans. New America reached out to the government of Chad for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response.
Strikes by Libyan Belligerents: the GNA and the LNA

The local warring factions are the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord, each with international backing, financing, and weapons support.

Tensions between General Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army faction, and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, who heads the government recognized by the UN, have left Libya fractured despite several formal attempts to broker ceasefire or peace agreements between them. The two strongmen lead the main forces operating on the ground in Libya: al-Sarraj’s internationally recognized GNA, which controls the capital and territory in western Libya; and the LNA, which maintains influence in eastern Libya and seized major oil ports. The LNA currently controls more than two-thirds of Libya’s territory.112

Various militias, some of which have ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, back the GNA.113 Compared to the funding that Haftar’s LNA reportedly receives from countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or the UAE, the GNA militias reportedly use old Soviet weapons from Gaddafi’s reign.114 As discussed in a previous section, a Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan official source told New America before the release of this report that Jordan has not financially backed or provided any military resources or training in Libya. Turkey attempted to fill that gap by selling hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment to the GNA,115 however, Turkey is only one country compared to the numerous financial backers and strike partners of the LNA.

The LNA, in its early stages, promised to liberate Libya from what Haftar perceived to be corrupt and radical Islamists, particularly those governing the country. Haftar launched the Benghazi offensive in 2014 to cleanse the city of jihadist combatants, followed by multiple, yet unsuccessful, attempts to take over Tripoli. Over time, Haftar’s secular focus has changed by continuously seeking out help from just about anyone who is willing to assist, from Salafists to former Gaddafi affiliates.116 Note that support from Salafists is something the UAE has had difficulty reconciling since leaders are staunch supporters of containing political Islam.117 Haftar also receives support from local tribal leaders he allegedly pays off118 for permission to absorb their land into the jurisdiction of the LNA. With air support from the United States, the GNA has sought to hold territory and protect its legitimacy as Libya’s central government. However, over the years, Haftar has significantly increased LNA territory. In the last two years, civilian fatality counts have drastically increased. See Figure 6 for more on GNA and LNA strikes.
### Air/Drone/Artillery Strikes Resultant Deaths by GNA or LNA compared to All Belligerent Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>GNA</th>
<th>LNA</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>466</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>214</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strikes by the Government of National Accord

GNA Prime Minister al-Sarraj has continued to try to reach a compromise with Haftar’s LNA, but has been unable to negotiate a successful ceasefire or disarm militias, which the UN hoped his unity government would achieve. Since the conflict with the GNA began, Haftar and the LNA have effectively dodged multiple scenarios where sanctions should have been implemented. Furthermore, Haftar’s campaign continued without him signing and following through on any agreements made in official diplomacy negotiations. The GNA declared a state of emergency in September 2018 after a declared ceasefire broke into conflict again. Six months later, Haftar began his Tripoli offensive, hoping to take over the capital.

According to New America and Airwars data that captures public reports of GNA strikes, from June through December 2018, the GNA conducted two airstrikes, and may have conducted an additional joint strike with Italy. However, the GNA was much more active in 2019, conducting 338 strikes with between 39 civilian deaths, taking the lowest estimate and as many as 54 taking the highest estimate. The GNA conducted 10 additional strikes with Turkey, which yielded between seven and nine civilian deaths. In some cases it is not discernible whether Turkey operated independently. There are another 22 GNA or LNA strikes that are either attributed to both groups or undetermined, which resulted in between 12 and 13 civilian deaths.

In 2020, there have been 12 strikes conducted by the GNA through February 5, two strikes with Turkey, and possibly an additional four that are either GNA or LNA, resulting in one civilian casualty. Cases where either the GNA or LNA is listed implicate more than one belligerent, which could mean either or both parties were responsible. New America reached out to the government of Libya for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response. See Appendices B and K for more strikes by the GNA.

Strikes by Libyan National Army

The LNA’s relentless airstrike campaigns across the country have yielded a vast territorial gain since the summer of 2018. After the battle for the city of Derna, which started in 2018, the LNA refocused its attention on the southern oil crescent. According to New America and Airwars data that captures public reports of LNA strikes, from June through December 2018, the LNA launched at least 60 strikes with eight to 11 civilian fatalities, as well as another seven strikes that were likely in coordination with France. By the end of January 2019, Haftar had taken over the southern city of Sabha, and continued capturing other cities until he announced his pending takeover of Tripoli. The LNA’s controlled territory encompasses more than two-thirds of Libya.
“Operation Flood of Dignity,” while impactful in the number of strikes and resultant deaths, was unsuccessful in taking over the capital in 2019. The day after this western Libya offensive commenced, UN Secretary-General António Guterres flew to Benghazi to meet with Haftar.\textsuperscript{123} He beseeched the General to change course, without success. Later that day, as he departed, Guterres tweeted, “I leave Libya with a heavy heart and deeply concerned. I still hope it is possible to avoid a bloody confrontation in and around Tripoli. The UN is committed to facilitating a political solution and, whatever happens, the UN is committed to supporting the Libyan people.”\textsuperscript{124}

The LNA launched 910 strikes over the course of 2019. As a result, there were 67 civilian deaths taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 114 taking the highest estimate. The LNA also conducted at least 67 strikes in coordination with the UAE, causing 125 civilian deaths, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 167 taking the highest estimate. There are an additional 22 unidentified GNA or LNA strikes, which resulted in 12 to 13 civilian deaths. Cases where either the GNA or LNA is listed implicate more than one belligerent, which could mean either or both parties were responsible.

The LNA and its affiliates launched a few unconcealed attacks on civilians that received significant international coverage, as well as backlash from the international community. For example, on July 3, 2019, the LNA and UAE jointly struck a migrant detention center in Tajoura, right outside Tripoli. Between 40 to 80 civilians died in that strike out of 120 individuals in the building. The LNA denied that its strike hit that location, but local media associated with the LNA reported that there were airstrikes taking place in that exact area of Tripoli.\textsuperscript{125} Then, there was the Janzur Equestrian Club\textsuperscript{126} strike outside of Tripoli that injured six children, killed several horses, and destroyed club facilities. The UN investigated the nature of the strike location, determining that there were no military targets located in the facility.\textsuperscript{127}

The LNA and affiliates’ aggressive strategy over the last year has shown their collective disregard for ensuring civilian safety. The LNA launched 69 strikes between January 1, 2020 and February 5, 2020, which have yielded between 15 to 16 civilian deaths, and another three strikes with the UAE, yielding three civilian deaths. There are another possible four strikes either by the GNA or LNA that have resulted in one additional civilian fatality. The indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets is increasingly common with the LNA, and many of these strikes have been identified as war crimes. However, Haftar, like many others, has not been charged. Even those who have intentionally ignored the weapons embargoes go unscathed. The only sanctions have been against human traffickers,\textsuperscript{128} while Haftar ignores warrants from the International Criminal Court.\textsuperscript{129} See Appendices C and K for more strikes by the LNA.
Other International Supporters Not Conducting Strikes

Multiple additional states are actively involved in the Libyan conflict. Each of them participates in various capacities, from funding to providing weapons to training. Open sources reports state that Jordan, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia all support the LNA. Both Jordan and Sudan have allegedly offered weapons to the LNA, and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) involvement is debated. As stated in a previous section of this report, a Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan official source told New America before the release of this report that Jordan has not financially backed or provided any military resources or training in Libya. In December 2019, the Libya Panel of Experts for a UN report claimed that 1,000 Sudanese RSF were sent to Libya in July 2019 to support Haftar, but the Sudan Panel of Experts a month later claimed that the RSF was not involved to that extent. Some of these Sudanese individuals were linked to alleged killings, kidnappings, and robberies against southern Libyans. Jordanian armored vehicles were identified in Libya. Saudi Arabia allegedly provided millions of dollars in financial support, intended to train LNA fighters, and paid off local officials, similar to what the UAE’s funding has accomplished. Saudi Arabia’s funds in April 2019 were intended to support Haftar’s Tripoli offensive. Qatar, on the other hand, currently financially backs the GNA but does not conduct airstrikes on its behalf. Russia holds a unique supporting role in Libya. Russian mercenaries are not new to the conflict in Libya, nor is their relationship with Libya and the wider region. After Gaddafi was ousted after the 2011 NATO intervention, Russia reportedly lost arms contracts worth 7 billion USD, something that had ensured their influence in the country, as well as with Libya’s surrounding neighbors. New America reached out to the governments of Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response.

While difficult to ascertain whether they have conducted airstrikes, they are allegedly supporting the LNA with weapons and financing, according to the GNA, the United States, and others. When representatives from the United States and the LNA met in November 2019, part of the statement the United States released read: “The officials underscored the United States’ full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya and expressed serious concern over Russia’s exploitation of the conflict at the expense of the Libyan people.” The official U.S. AFRICOM posture statement says that “Russian private military companies (PMCs) have a highly destabilizing influence in Africa…In Libya, Russian PMCs almost certainly downed a U.S. unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a sophisticated Russian air defense system.” Additionally, AFRICOM states, “Russia continues to harvest benefits from the instability in Libya - its military meddling has prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties and humanitarian suffering...its private military companies, such as the Wagner Group with strong links to the Kremlin, are leading the fight for the self-styled ‘Libyan National Army.’” It is becoming
increasingly clear that, as the United States steps back in some of the conflicts it was once active in, Russia is finding ways to insert itself in hopes of securing regional influence.

Investigative reporting by the *Daily Beast* in September 2019 alleges that Russian mercenaries claim Haftar has gained territory across Libya not by military might, but by bribing local officials with money from the United Arab Emirates. Yet, with this alleged LNA alliance, Russia has a Russia-first policy, and has chosen, when appropriate, to upend Haftar’s advances if it helps the Kremlin. For example, Russia allegedly met with Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and has allegedly plotted with Sudan to complicate the military advances of Haftar on Tripoli. However, Russia changed its posture again when it held diplomatic talks in Moscow between the LNA and GNA in January 2020. Russia continues to claim that it does not have any military presence or troops within the borders of Libya but, reportedly, there are at least 500 and as many as 800 or even thousands of Russian mercenaries in Tripoli. New America reached out to the government of Russia for comment before the report’s release, but did not receive a response.

**The U.S. Counterterrorism War and Libya**

Libya is one of the many countries where the United States conducts air and drone strikes as part of its international counterterrorism measures outside of traditional war zones. Other countries where the United States has similar counterterrorism campaigns include Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

**Civilian Deaths by United States from Airstrikes Across Conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012-2020</td>
<td>11-21</td>
<td>26-57</td>
<td>115-149</td>
<td>245-303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strikes</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Libya civilian deaths data are based on the New America-Airwars study; Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen civilian deaths data are based on figures from New America databases as of February 5, 2020. Note: Operations in Somalia and Yemen include a number of ground raids in addition to airstrikes.*
Compared to other belligerents in the Libya conflict, the United States has been transparent in its reporting of air and drone strikes, as well as any resultant civilian fatalities. However, in the past few years, the Trump administration started to walk back Obama-era policies that required strike reporting by the U.S. government. This action by the Trump administration forces the public to push the Pentagon for continued transparency regarding U.S. involvement in conflicts abroad. For example, President Trump replaced the Obama administration’s 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) with the Principles, Standards and Procedures (PSP) in 2017. Many of the policies were not drastically different from this document’s predecessor, yet a couple of policies stood out in stark contrast to old protections. For example, the Trump administration lowered the threshold at which the United States can track and kill an alleged terrorist, and drone strikes under the U.S. counterterrorism program going forward would not require the same assessments as before, meaning that the previous number of approvals before a strike were no longer required.

→ HOW UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND DETERMINES STRIKE COUNTS

When AFRICOM confirms a “strike” in Libya, this may include one munition, or multiple bombings on a single target, based on information from press releases. In releases related to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Syria, AFRICOM defined strikes in press releases as the following:

“A strike, as defined in the Coalition release, refers to one or more kinetic engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use. Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.”

Since June 2018, New America and Airwars research has found 11 airstrikes conducted by the United States in coordination with the Government of National Accord, killing at least 59 combatants. In an email to New America before the report was released, U.S. AFRICOM stated that the United States had conducted 10 airstrikes against ISIS-Libya and AQIM terrorist targets (six total airstrikes in Libya in 2018, and four in 2019). New America and Airwars have not counted any
civilian deaths caused by U.S. airstrikes in this timeframe. Many of those strikes occurred in the southern area of Murzuq, where ISIS resides. See Figure 7 and Figure 8 for more on U.S. strikes.

Figure 7:
The LNA mistakenly shot down a U.S. drone in November 2019.\textsuperscript{150} Representatives from the LNA stated that the drone looked similar to a Turkish drone. Around the same time, an unarmed Italian Air Force Reaper drone\textsuperscript{51} was also shot down. The LNA alleged that the Italian drone also looked similar to GNA-supporting Turkish drones. In the United States AFRICOM 2020 posture statement for Libya, the U.S. stated, “In Libya, Russian PMCs almost certainly downed a U.S. unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a sophisticated Russian air defense system.”

Then, in December 2019, a press statement issued by the U.S. Department of State read:

The United States is concerned by the Government of National Accord’s request for military support, and by the LNA’s threat to use foreign-supplied air assets and mercenaries to attack Misrata. External military intervention threatens prospects for resolving the conflict. We deplore attacks on innocent civilians and call on all sides to refrain from...
escalation. The United States is prepared to work with the U.N. and all the parties to initiate political negotiations. The recent inclusive U.S.-Libya Economic Dialogue in Tunis demonstrated constructive progress is possible if external actors give Libyans the time and space to engage with each other.\textsuperscript{152}

There have not been any subsequent airstrikes after the release of this statement. Over the course of our research since 2012, New America and Airwars have documented 550 total airstrikes attributed to the United States in media reports. Strikes in our database attributed solely to the United States resulted in a minimum of 11 and maximum of 21 civilian deaths.

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\textbf{WHAT IS THE U.S. POLICY ON LIBYA?}

The U.S. involvement in Libya has generally lessened since President Trump took office. In 2017 the U.S. strike count peaked at 17, in 2018 there were five, and in 2019 there were seven.

In July 2018, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte of Italy visited the White House. In a joint press conference, he and President Trump discussed Libya and Italy’s role in stabilizing the region.\textsuperscript{153} The following November, the Palermo conference on Libya took place in Italy; neither President Trump nor Secretary of State Pompeo attended, but Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield attended. Palermo had fewer senior global leaders than anticipated. Some argue low attendance was due to the earlier scheduling of the Paris Peace Forum.\textsuperscript{154} President Trump did not attend the Forum either.

On February 19, 2019, right before 2011 Executive Order 13566—which declared a formal pause on specific financial/economic transactions with Libya due to fear of mismanagement by the Gaddafi regime—was about to expire, President Trump extended the order to continue beyond the end of the month.\textsuperscript{155} Trump mentioned the intractable conflict as reason to extend the order, highlighting the concern over instability from groups formerly aligned with Gaddafi. He ordered to keep sanctions in place; otherwise, ISIS and other terrorist groups could thrive off any diverted resources entering the country, causing a national security threat to the United States.

The following April, a controversial phone call took place between General Haftar and President Trump. After reported discussions between President Trump and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, as well as Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan—both staunch supporters of
President Trump had a conversation with Haftar about his Tripoli offensive, and allegedly praised the General for his dedication to fighting terrorism. Many viewed this conversation as problematic because the United States has long supported the GNA, and was instrumental in the NATO intervention in 2011. Discussing success with Haftar sent mixed messages to the international community about U.S. support, as well as confusion about whether or not the United States could maintain a policy in Libya that supported the GNA while its strong trade partners—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—backed the LNA.

The U.S. embassy in Libya closed in 2015, relocating to Tunis, Tunisia. On August 1, 2019, the U.S. Senate confirmed Ambassador Richard B. Norland to serve as U.S. ambassador to Libya. Nearly four months later, representatives from the U.S. State Department met with General Haftar. Ambassador Norland was present, as well as Deputy National Security Advisor for Middle Eastern and North African Affairs Victoria Coates, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Energy Matthew Zais, and AFRICOM Deputy Director for Strategy, Engagement, and Programs Brigadier General Steven deMilliano. According to the press release issued by the State Department, at the meeting, U.S. officials highlighted the sovereignty of Libya as a country, and discussed concerns regarding Russia's support of the LNA, and the consequences that would yield.

GNA Prime Minister Al-Sarraj traveled to the UN in New York in September 2019, followed by a trip to Washington, D.C. to plead with the United States to become more involved in the crisis. In November 2019, U.S. officials met with General Haftar to discuss prospects for ending the war. This was the week after the LNA mistakenly shot down both an Italian drone and a U.S. drone. By the end of 2019, the United States still affirmed that its airstrikes in Libya against ISIS were in direct support of and approved by the GNA. The United States AFRICOM 2020 posture statement says, “Our persistent focus on ISIS-Libya, in coordination with our interagency and African partners and at low cost in Department of Defense resources, continues to disrupt ISIS freedom of action as a regional terrorist threat.”
The Jihadist Environment in Libya Today

Jihadist terrorism across Libya is still a concern, but the ISIS of yesteryear is a shell of what is was before the U.S.-led Sirte campaign took place in 2016, which expelled ISIS from the city that December.\(^\text{162}\) Those remaining have apparently set up “desert camps ... [to hide] fighters and weaponry” in the Sahara or have established “sleeper cells” in parts of Sirte. Despite these hidden groups, there is a potential opening to revitalize the ISIS agenda while the LNA and GNA are prioritizing Tripoli and other areas. With Haftar’s January 2020 capture of Sirte,\(^\text{163}\) the dynamics may be different, but his eyes are set on the capital.

Reports from Sirte claim that U.S. military officials believe there are nearly 100 ISIS militants in Libya, down from the 5,000 Libya once had.\(^\text{164}\) Militants who set up camps in the Sahara found ways to adapt. They “have seized trucks carrying fuel and gained other revenue by taxing human traffickers and arms smugglers.”\(^\text{165}\) Others joined affiliates in neighboring countries, or opted to support al-Qaeda.\(^\text{166}\) Despite the dwindling numbers, mysterious checkpoints started to pop up around the city. Even with relatively small numbers, ISIS has been active.

AFRICOM directed airstrikes against several ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) targets in June 2018.\(^\text{167}\) While the belligerent is unknown, on July 25, 2018, AQIM’s Tunisian lead Ramzi Mansour died in the western area of Ubari when a vehicle he was traveling in was hit by an airstrike.\(^\text{168}\) A few months later, on November 29, 2018, AFRICOM conducted an airstrike near Al Uwaynat, targeting three AQIM vehicles, killing 11 militants.\(^\text{169}\) Less than two months after that, another three AQIM members, one of which was commander Abu Talha al-Libi, were killed in an airstrike in Jabal al Uwaynat, located in southeast Libya.\(^\text{170}\)

By the beginning of 2019, the United States had targeted AQIM once again, in coordination with the GNA, in an airstrike in the western area of Ubari.\(^\text{171}\) Then, in April 2019, between five or six AQIM or Islamic State militants were killed in a nighttime air raid in southeast Libya.\(^\text{172}\) Later reports alleged that four of the individuals killed were civilians.\(^\text{173}\) Libyan government officials affiliated with the GNA tracked AQIM until July 2019, when they raided a compound to arrest multiple militants.\(^\text{174}\)

ISIS attacked the Kaam Gate checkpoint in southwest Libya in August 2018.\(^\text{175}\) Their original intent to explode a car bomb failed when the bomb did not detonate. In an attempt to correct the course of their attack, ISIS resorted to gunfire and grenades, killing four and injuring three. Shortly after that incident, AFRICOM killed an ISIS leader in an airstrike who fled from Sirte.\(^\text{176}\)

From the middle of September through the end of December 2018, ISIS had a streak of largely successful attacks. First on September 12, ISIS attacked Libya’s
National Oil Corporation,\textsuperscript{177} killing two employees and wounding another 10. Then, on December 9, they killed six individuals they had abducted from al-Fuqaha\textsuperscript{178} in central Libya, earlier in October. An additional attack occurred in December on Libya’s Foreign Ministry, killing at least three people and injuring 10 others.\textsuperscript{179}

In May 2019, ISIS struck again. This time they targeted an LNA training camp, killing at least nine people in the hospital portion of the camp. ISIS alleged to have freed prisoners from a jail, but officials interviewed did not confirm the claim.\textsuperscript{180}

Between September and early October 2019, official statements from AFRICOM say the United States struck towns in southern Libya four times, reportedly killing 43 ISIS militants.\textsuperscript{181} However, New America and Airwars tracked two additional possible strikes according to local reports in Libya. This was the most active the United States had been throughout 2019. With the exception of a strike recorded in Ubari in February 2019, which AFRICOM has not publicly confirmed, the United States’ last strike in Libya was ten months prior. Additionally, in an email from AFRICOM to New America, an official confirmed that AFRICOM forces relocated from Libya in April 2019 due to security conditions on the ground, adding, “Since that time, the command has continued to monitor conditions and terrorist activity in Libya; where appropriate, the command will take action. The command recognizes that a secure and stable Libya ensures regional security, and we remain in close coordination with the State Department.”

After ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019, and replaced with Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi, the Emir of ISIS in Libya, Abdul Qadr al-Najdi pledged allegiance to him.\textsuperscript{182}
Conclusion

Several years after the NATO intervention in 2011, the warring factions in Libya continue to destabilize the country. The internationally recognized government—the GNA—led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, and the opposing forces of the LNA, led by General Haftar, continue to fight for who will rule Libya. Both the LNA and the GNA conduct air/drone/artillery strikes, and are each backed by multiple countries that also launch air and drone strikes. From 2012 through February 5, 2020, 4,349 strikes were conducted, 2,348 of those were by the LNA alone. According to news reports and accounts on social media, at least 1,820 total individuals were killed in these strikes, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 2,440 killed, by the highest estimate. Of these recorded deaths, between 611 and 899 are civilians.

Both the GNA and LNA have international backers that financially support them, provide weapons and armed vehicles, or provide military training. This ever-evolving proxy conflict raises the question of whether the international community needs to address the increasing frequency of proxy forces in conflicts with a policy response. Mercenaries and other paramilitaries are entering the conflict on both sides, calling into question the ruling ability of either the GNA or the LNA. International political influence is embedded in the conflict outside of the civil war that promulgated after Gaddafi’s overthrow. The GNA receives support from Turkey with air and drone strikes, as well as troops, and the United States, which carries out air and drone strikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Egypt and the UAE conduct air and drone strikes in support of the LNA or against Islamist militias. France also strikes Islamist militant targets in Libya, yet while it claims to support GNA, its actual support through weapons and strikes is in alignment with the LNA. The air/drone/artillery strikes by seven international belligerents and the GNA and LNA continue to amplify the conflict, since more than half of all strikes have taken place in the last 20 months.

Since 2011, each international belligerent in the conflict has had a strategic interest in Libya and the wider region. France and Egypt have each defended their airstrikes in Libya, citing self-defense in an attempt to protect themselves from armed terrorist groups. This is similar to the United States’ justification made after 9/11 to begin its drone program in Pakistan. Egypt’s 42 strikes have resulted in at least 13 and at most 14 civilian deaths, according to local and international sources. France’s five strikes have resulted in a minimum of four and potentially as many as eight civilian deaths. France might also be responsible for seven strikes in 2018, likely conducted with the coordination of the LNA. The United Arab Emirates’ 131 strikes since it entered the conflict in 2016 have reportedly resulted in at least 135 and potentially as many as 185 civilian deaths. Turkey entered the conflict in 2019. It has allegedly conducted strikes unilaterally as well as with the GNA 22 times, resulting in between 10 and 12 civilian deaths.
Haftar’s LNA, while not the internationally recognized government of Libya, has nevertheless been relatively transparent in declaring military actions. Despite the LNA’s transparency, the resultant civilian casualties from their air campaign has drastically increased, setting unprecedented levels of devastation. The LNA accounts for more than half of all strikes, more than one-third of civilian deaths, and one-third of overall deaths. This sharp increase indicates the LNA’s and its affiliates’ willingness to forego civil protection efforts as it aims to overtake Tripoli.

Reported civilian deaths from airstrikes in Libya have drastically increased since June 2018. In the last 20 months, over 1,800 airstrikes were conducted, accounting for more than half of the number of civilian casualties throughout the course of the entire conflict. The U.S.contribution to these numbers is relatively low, despite the high strike count. Civilian fatality numbers are far less than those of other U.S. interventions, such as Yemen and Pakistan, and are closer to the known civilian recorded fatalities in Somalia.

This increased danger from air/drone/artillery strikes has caused families to flee various cities throughout Libya. Reports by the UN indicate that there are at least 355,672 internally displaced people and 47,079 registered refugees and asylum seekers due to the ongoing conflict across Libya. Refugees and migrants, including children, have to combat exploitation and trafficking, and some factions of the conflict have recruited children.

The economy of Libya is not stable either. Since mid-January 2020, the LNA has blocked oil fields and airport export terminals, forcing the reduction of crude oil to 163,684 barrels per day. Petroleum exports account for over two-thirds of Libya’s exports. This estimated loss in revenue is over USD $1.4 billion, drastically reducing Libya’s growth potential.

Civilian non-combatants have faced the brunt of the danger, from economic instability to airstrikes and artillery shelling to other concerns along the path of escape, such as exploitation and abuse. International intervention attempts have widely failed as multiple Libya Summits have taken place, yielding documents with stipulations of ceasefires and arms embargoes that have fallen through within days of signing, if signed at all. As the international community attempts to broker peace deals though diplomatic interventions, only time will tell if face-to-face interactions with al-Sarraj and Haftar will put forth legitimate options for the citizens of this conflicted state, as well as how much international politics will influence this proxy conflict in the long-term.
Appendices

APPENDIX A: United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Libya since June 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
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<td>S/RES/2510 (2020)</td>
<td>12 February 2020</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2509 (2020)</td>
<td>11 February 2020</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2486(2019)</td>
<td>12 September 2019</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2473(2019)</td>
<td>10 June 2019</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
</tr>
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<td>S/RES/2441 (2018)</td>
<td>5 November 2018</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/2434 (2018)</td>
<td>13 September 2018</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2420 (2018)</td>
<td>11 June 2018</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
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APPENDIX B: Government of National Accord Strikes in Libya

2018

- Aug 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)
- November 14 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

2019

- January 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)
- January 19 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- April 5 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara); average civilian death: 5; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 6
- April 6 (2 strikes) Jabal al Gharbi: Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Qaryat (Jabal al Gharbi)

newamerica.org/international-security/reports/airstrikes-proxy-warfare-and-civilian-casualties-libya/
• April 6 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• April 6 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• April 8 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• April 8 (1 strike) in Sokna (Jufra)

• April 9 (1 strike) in Ash Shwayrif (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli; Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

• April 10 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 5

• April 10 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 11 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); Sugh el Ahad (Tripoli)

• April 11 (1 strike) in Sokna (Jufra)

• April 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• April 12 (1 strike) Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 13 (1 strike) Tarhuna (Murqub)

• April 13 (1 strike) Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• April 13 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 13 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli); average civilian death: 4; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 4

• April 14 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 14 (4 strikes) in Tripoli; Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2; Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 4; Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
• April 14 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• April 15 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli)

• April 16 (1 strike) in Hun (Jufra)

• April 16 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 16 (2 strikes) in Tripoli; Asbi’ah Tripoli; Ain Zara: Al Buashi gas station (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• April 16 in (1 strike) Tarhuna (Murqub)

• April 17 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 18 (1 strike) in Hun (Jufra)

• April 19 (1 strike) Asabi’ah: Jendouba mall (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 20 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Bi’r Altota (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

• April 20 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• April 20 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 23 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 23 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• April 23 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• April 25 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 25 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Afia Clinic (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Tripoli: Al Hadba (Tripoli)

• April 27 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaiha (Tripoli); Average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 3
• April 27 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 28 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Al-Kheikh (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Alim (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Tajoura (Tripoli)

• April 28 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• April 29 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 29 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• April 30 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• April 30 (1 strike) in Sabratha (Zawiya)

• April 30 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 1 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• May 2 (1 strike) in Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli)

• May 2 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 3 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 3 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• May 5 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1.5; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 2

• May 5 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 5 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 6 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut)

• May 6 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 7 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 10 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)
• May 11 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 12 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 12 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• May 13 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 13 (1 strike) in Jufra (Jufra)

• May 14 (1 strike) Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 14 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Almalja (Tripoli); average civilian death: 6; low civilian death: 6; high civilian death: 6

• May 15 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Ali bin Abi Talib mosque (Tripoli)

• May 15 (2 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Qawasim (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3; Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• May 17 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 18 (2 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashi (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli)

• May 21 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• May 21 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 22 (2 strikes) in Tripoli Asbi’ah (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

• May 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• May 24 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli)

• May 26 (1 strike) in Jufra (Jufra)

• May 27 (1 strike) in Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli)
• May 28 (4 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli); Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport Tripoli; Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• May 28 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• May 29 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3

• May 29 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• May 30 (4 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi); Burshada (Jabal al Gharbi); Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Abu Shaiba (Jabal al Gharbi)

• May 30 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• May 30 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• June 1 (2 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Burshada (Jabal al Gharbi)

• June 2 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• June 3 (2 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• June 4 (4 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• June 5 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• June 6 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli)

• June 6 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• June 10 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli airport (Tripoli); South of Tripoli (Tripoli)

• June 12 (1 strike) in College of Engineering (Tajura)
- June 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli; Tripoli airport (Tripoli); Customs Authority building in Salah Al-Din neighborhood of Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 14 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 16 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- June 17 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

- June 18 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- June 19 (1 strike) in Asbi’ah (Tripoli)

- June 19 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- June 20 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); South of Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 24 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

- June 24 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- June 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 25 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- June 26 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

- June 26 (1 strike) in Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- June 30 (1 strike) in Asbi’ah (Tripoli)

- July 1 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

- July 2 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

- July 3 (1 strike) in Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

- July 4 (1 strike) in Asiab’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 5 (1 strike) in Brak (Wadi al Shatii)
- July 5 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)
- July 5 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 7 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
- July 8 (2 strikes) Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- July 14 (1 strike) in Fassano (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 14 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- July 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Qaiwu triangle (Tripoli)
- July 18 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- July 19 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Tripoli: Yarmouk (Tripoli)
- July 19 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 4
- July 20 (2 strikes) in Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- July 22 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Marazeeq school (Tripoli); average civilian death: 4; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 4; Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 23 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Alota (Tripoli)
- July 24 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- July 24 (1 strike) in Nasmah (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 25 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
- July 28 (1 strike) in Mizdah (Jabal al Gharbi)
• July 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

• July 30 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• August 1 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadaba Al Badri (Tripoli)

• August 2 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• August 5 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura(Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• August 6 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

• August 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

• August 16 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• August 22 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli: Al Karizma (Tripoli); Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli)

• August 26 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 27 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 29 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

• September 2 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• September 2 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 3 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 5 (1 strike) in Urban (Murqub)

• September 5 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 7 (2 strikes) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 7 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Asbi’ah (Tripoli); Tajoura: Muthalath Al Qiou (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
• September 8 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 8 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli)

• September 9 (3 strikes) Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Souq Al Sabet (Tripoli); Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli)

• September 11 (1 strike) in Al Urban (Murqub); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

• September 13 (1 strike) in Jufra Air base (Jufra)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Al Ja‘afarah Jabal al (Gharbi)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• September 15 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• September 16 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Asbi‘ah (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

• September 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Sewehli (Tripoli)

• September 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Sewehli (Tripoli)

• September 23 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Bi‘r Allaq (Tripoli); Asbi‘ah (Tripoli); Sidi as Sa‘is (Tripoli)

• September 24 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Asbi‘ah Tripoli

• September 25 (1 strike) in Asbi‘ah (Tripoli)

• September 30 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Sa’adeh (Tripoli)

• October 9 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 16 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• October 17 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- October 21 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- October 23 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- October 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mohammed Al-Durra Mosque (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli)
- October 29 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwisha (Tripoli)
- October 30 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)
- October 30 (1 strike) in Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli)
- November 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Shok (Tripoli)
- November 6 (1 strike) in Jufra Air base (Jufra)
- November 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)
- November 13 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Souq Al Sabet (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- November 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- November 22 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli)
- November 23 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)
- November 30 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)
- November 30 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)
- December 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- December 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- December 5 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli)
- December 10 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
December 12 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin Tripoli; average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

December 13 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Souq Al Ahed (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Alota (Tripoli)

December 14 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli)

December 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

December 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

December 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

December 25 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

December 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Furusiya bridge (Tripoli)

2020

January 1 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

January 2 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tariq Al Seka (Tripoli); Ben Ashour (Tripoli)

January 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Arada (Tripoli)

January 4 (1 strike) in Mizdah (Jabal al Gharbi)

January 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadaba Al Badri (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

January 7 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte)

January 8 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte)

January 8 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

January 9 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

January 11 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
• January 19 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• January 23 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• February 1 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte)

APPENDIX C: Libyan National Army Strikes in Libya

2018

• June 3 (1 strike) in Umm Al Aranib (Murzuq)

• June 3 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

• June 4 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

• June 12 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• June 15 (1 strike) in Nofaliya (Sirte)

• June 16 (1 strike) in Ras Lanuf (Sirte); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 3

• June 17 (1 strike) in Ras Lanuf (Sirte)

• June 18 (1 strike) in Ras Lanuf (Sirte); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

• June 21 (1 strike) in Ras Lanuf (Sirte)

• June 23 (1 strike) in Bani Walid (Misrata)

• August 11 (1 strike) in Al Seddada (Misrata)

• August 11 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

• August 12 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

• August 13 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

• September 16 (1 strike) in Umm Al Aranib (Murzuq)
- September 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

- September 24 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

- October 13 (1 strike) in Tmassah (Murzuq)

- November 17 (1 strike) in Al Seddada (Misrata)

- December 5 (1 strike) in Haruj Mountains (Jufra)

2019

- January 12 (1 strike) in Jabal al Uwaynat (Kufra)

- January 23 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

- January 24 (1 strike) in Libya-Tunisia Border

- January 29 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- February 1 (1 strike) in Ghadduwah (Sabha)

- February 3 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq); average civilian death: 12; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 20

- February 6 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- February 8 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- February 9 (1 strike) in El Feel oil field (Murzuq)

- February 11 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- February 15 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- February 17 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- February 20 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

- April 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)
• April 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport Tripoli

• April 11 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• April 12 (1 strike) in Zuwarah (Nuqat al Khums)

• April 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• April 13 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• April 14 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• April 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim Tripoli; average civilian death: 5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 7

• April 17 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• April 17 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 18 (1 strike) in Tajoura Tripoli

• April 18 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Janzur Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Janzur: Thogar (Tripoli)

• April 18 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 19 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 20 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 20 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)

• April 20 (1 strike) in Al-Kasarat (Jafara)

• April 23 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

• April 23 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

• April 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport Tripoli
• April 25 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Airport road Tripoli; average civilian death: 5; low civilian death: 5; high civilian death: 5

• April 27 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• April 29 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin Tripoli; Yarmouk Tripoli; Al-Swani: Tugar Tripoli

• April 30 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Sabaha (Tripoli)

• May 1 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• May 2 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Yarmouk (Tripoli)

• May 3 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

• May 4 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• May 5 (2 strikes) in Tajoura (Tripoli); Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• May 5 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• May 6 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• May 7 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• May 8 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli) Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisla (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• May 8 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)
- May 9 (8 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Awlad Bin Asmad (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Alim (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Ain Zara Tripoli

- May 10 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Banana project Tripoli; Tajoura (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

- May 10 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

- May 11 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

- May 11 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

- May 11 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

- May 11 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

- May 12 (3 strikes) in Tripoli, Tajoura: Al Jafina (Tripoli); average civilian death: 0.5; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 1; Tajoura (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- May 12 (1 strike) in Naser (Zawiya); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

- May 13 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3

- May 13 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- May 14 (2 strikes) in Al-Kasarat (Jafara)

- May 15 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- May 16 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Al Saadia (Tripoli)

- May 18 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

- May 19 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- May 20 (1 strike) in Al-Kasara (Jafara)
May 22 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

May 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1.5; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 2

May 24 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli); Rixos Hotel (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

May 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

May 26 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al Kremiah (Tripoli)

May 27 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli)

May 27 (1 strike) in Al-Kasarat (Jafara)

May 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

May 29 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

May 29 (1 strike) in Abu Shaiba (Jabal al Gharbi)

May 29 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

May 30 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

May 31 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur: Al Kremiah (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)

June 1 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al Kremiah (Tripoli)

June 4 (5 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Al-Khaltat street (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

June 5 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Kremiah (Tripoli)

June 6 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)
- June 6 (1 strike) in Abushaba

- June 6 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Al-Hadba (Tripoli); Al-Hadba (Tripoli); Al-Karimia (Tripoli)

- June 7 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga Airport (Tripoli)

- June 8 (1 strike) in Al-Saadiya area in Wershefana

- June 8 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

- June 8 (1 strike) in The Muz Project

- June 8 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Naqlia (Tripoli); Ein Zara (Tripoli); Almaraziq (Tripoli)

- June 11 (1 strike) in College of Engineering (Tajura)

- June 11 (2 strikes) in Misrata (Misrata)

- June 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli)

- June 13 (2 strikes) in the military college in Hadaba (Tripoli)

- June 13 (1 strike) in the banana project in the region of Sabha (Sabha)

- June 13 (2 strikes) in Ein Zara (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

- June 14 (7 strike) in Tripoli: Emdad camp (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tripoli airport (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)

- June 15 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Tajoura Heart Hospital (Tripoli); average civilian death: 5; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 9

- June 16 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Tajoura: Tajoura Heart Hospital (Tripoli)

- June 17 (6 strikes) in Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- June 18 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)
June 19 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

June 20 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ruwaymi prison (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

June 21 (5 strikes) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

June 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli)

June 26 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli)

June 27 (2 strikes) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

June 28 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

June 29 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

July 1 (3 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Al Hadba (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

July 2 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Yarmouk (Tripoli)

July 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

July 4 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

July 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

July 6 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

July 7 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

July 7 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2; Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

July 9 (1 strike) in Gheryan: Tgessat (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death 1.5; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 3

July 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)
- July 10 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 11 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 12 (2 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 12 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 13 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
- July 13 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 14 (2 strikes) in Tripoli Ain Zara (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)
- July 14 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 15 (3 strike) in Jabal al Gharbi: Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi); Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Asabi’ah: Jendouba mall (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 15 (1 strike) in Ain Zara: Kahily Mosque (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1.
- July 15 (1 strike) in Abou Mo’az camp
- July 16 (3 strikes) in Tripoli Al-Swani (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1.5; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 3; Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Arada (Tripoli)
- July 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)
- July 21 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadba (Tripoli)
- July 22 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)
- July 22 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- July 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)
- July 24 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)
- July 27 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)
- July 27 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- July 27 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); average civilian death: 4.5; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 5; Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli)

- July 29 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Castelverde (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

- July 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- July 31 (1 strike) in Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi)

- July 31 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli)

- August 1 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Ramla (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- August 2 (2 strikes) in Misrata: Misrata (Misrata); As Saddadah (Misrata)

- August 3 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli)

- August 3 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

- August 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

- August 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

- August 6 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

- August 7 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

- August 11 (2 strikes) in Misrata: As Saddadah (Misrata); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; As Saddadah (Misrata)

- August 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli)

- August 13 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

- August 13 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Tripoli International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli); West of Tripoli (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
• August 13 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• August 14 (1 strike) in As Saddadah (Misrata)

• August 14 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

• August 14 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• August 15 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); average civilian death 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death; Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• August 15 (1 strike) in Zuwara (Nuqat al Khums)

• August 16 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tripoli Zoo (Tripoli)

• August 16 (1 strike) in Zuwara (Nuqat al Khums)

• August 17 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• August 17 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 17 (1 strike) in Funqul (Murzuq)

• August 17 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• August 18 (2 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 18 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)

• August 18 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

• August 19 (1 strike) in Abu Kammash (Nuqat al Khums)

• August 19 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• August 19 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

• August 20 (2 strikes) in Tajoura: Muthalath Al Qjou (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• August 21 (2 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli); Asbi’ah (Tripoli)
• August 22 (1 strike) in Unknown

• August 22 (1 strike) in Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli)

• August 22 (1 strike) in Misrata: Al Saket (Misrata)

• August 22 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

• August 23 (1 strike) in Ghut Al Rih (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 23 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Chemistry camp (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)

• August 23 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• August 24 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Zanatah (Tripoli); Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli)

• August 25 (1 strike) in Wadi Ghan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 25 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• August 25 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• August 27 (1 strike) in Jabal al Gharbi: Bu Gheilan (Jabal al Gharbi); Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 27 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara); average civilian death: 0.5; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 1

• August 28 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• August 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)

• August 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• August 31 (2 strikes) in Jabal al Gharbi: Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi); Gheryan: Jendouba prison (Jabal al Gharbi)

• August 31 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• August 31 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq); average civilian death: 7; low civilian death: 6; high civilian death: 8
• September 1 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• September 5 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 6 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• September 7 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• September 7 (2 strikes) in (Jabal al Gharbi): Ghut Al Rih (Jabal al Gharbi); Gheryan: Jendouba prison (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli)

• September 8 (1 strike) in Unknown

• September 9 (3 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Al Daoua Al Islamiya (Tripoli)

• September 12 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 12 (1 strike) in Ghut Al Rih (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); oil tanks (Tripoli)

• September 13 (4 strikes) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte); Sirte (Sirte); Abu Nujaym (Sirte); Abu Qurayn (Sirte)

• September 14 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli); Al Sa’iqa camp (Tripoli); Sewehli (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• September 15 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• September 15 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)
• September 15 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: International Airport (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• September 15 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 16 (1 strike) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte)

• September 17 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Na'am camp (Tripoli); Tajoura: Jarma company (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Janzur: 7 April camp (Tripoli)

• September 18 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• September 18 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• September 18 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte)

• September 19 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Janzur (Tripoli); Asbi’ah (Tripoli)

• September 20 (1 strike) in Janzur (Tripoli)

• September 21 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Yarmouk (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Janzur (Tripoli); Furusiya bridge (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli)

• September 21 (1 strike) in As Saddadah (Misrata)

• September 21 (2 strike) in Jafara: Aziziya (Jafara); Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 22 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Sewehli (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Yarmouk (Tripoli)

• September 23 (2 strikes) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 23 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 23 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• September 24 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• September 24 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Sirte (Sirte); Wadi Jarif (Sirte)
• September 24 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• September 25 (2 strikes) in Misrata: Abugrein (Misrata); Al Qaddahiyah (Misrata)

• September 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Qaryo mosque (Tripoli)

• September 25 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 26 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli): Bi’r Allaq (Tripoli)

• September 26 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

• September 26 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• September 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• September 27 (1 strike) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte)

• September 27 (1 strike) in Ghadduwah (Sabha)

• September 28 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Wadi Jarif (Sirte); Sirte (Sirte)

• September 29 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• September 30 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• September 30 (1 strike) in Sirte: Ghardabya project (Sirte)

• September 30 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• October 1 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); International Airport (Tripoli); Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• October 1 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• October 2 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur: Jabas gate (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Sidi Salim (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1.5; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 2
• October 3 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Abu Salim (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2; Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli)

• October 3 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Sirte (Sirte); Ghardabya Air base (Sirte)

• October 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• October 5 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli)

• October 6 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte); Sirte: River project (Sirte)

• October 6 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Equestrian Club (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• October 6 (2 strikes) in Misrata (Misrata)

• October 6 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 7 (3 strikes) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte); Sirte (Sirte); Ghardabya Air base (Sirte)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 7 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); oil tanks (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• October 9 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Arada (Tripoli)

• October 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli)

• October 9 (2 strikes) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 10 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)
October 10 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

October 10 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli)

October 11 (2 strikes) in Ras Lafah (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)

October 11 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

October 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Banana project (Tripoli)

October 13 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: University of Africa (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3; Airport road (Tripoli)

October 13 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

October 13 (1 strike) in Surman (Zawiya)

October 14 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Fornaj (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3; Tajoura: Al Saadawi camp (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

October 15 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

October 15 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

October 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ben Ashour (Tripoli)

October 17 (3 strikes) in Misrata (Misrata)

October 18 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

October 18 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Tobacco factory (Tripoli); Wali Al Ahed street (Tripoli)

October 18 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

October 19 (3 strikes) in Misrata: Misrata (Misrata); Kerzaz (Misrata); Dafniyah (Misrata)
October 19 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

October 19 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

October 20 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

October 20 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

October 20 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

October 20 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Sewehli (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Al Ramla (Tripoli)

October 21 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

October 21 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

October 22 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli) average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3; Ain Zara (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

October 23 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Asfah Road (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3; Al Zohour (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

October 23 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

October 24 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Yarmouk camp (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

October 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

October 26 (2 strikes) in Misrata: Misrata (Misrata); As Saddadah (Misrata)

October 26 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Furusiya bridge (Tripoli)

October 27 (2 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

October 27 (1 strike) in Surman (Zawiya)
• October 29 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Gorje (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• October 29 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 30 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• October 30 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Furusiya bridge (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Baqara (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Rahba (Tripoli); Janzur (Tripoli)

• October 31 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Ministry of Interior (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 4; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 5; Al Zohour (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Rahba (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)

• November 2 (1 strike) in Shahoub camp (Nuqat al Khums)

• November 2 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• November 2 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tajoura: Goot Al Roman (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• November 3 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Al Tekbali camp (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• November 3 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• November 3 (2 strikes) in Misrata: Tmanh (Misrata); Misrata (Misrata)

• November 4 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Ain Zara: Four Streets Zuwita (Tripoli); Al Nokhba Clinic (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• November 5 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Goot Al Roman (Tripoli); Ain Zara: Al Grgani Petrol Station (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3; Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

• November 5 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• November 5 (1 strike) in Ghut Al Rih (Jabal al Gharbi)

• November 6 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)
November 6 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

November 7 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); in Khela Ben Oun: Wildlife garden (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli)

November 8 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Goot Al Roman (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Asbi‘ah (Tripoli)

November 8 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

November 9 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

November 10 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

November 12 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

November 12 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte); Sirte (Sirte)

November 13 (1 strike) in Ain Zara: Al-Hay Adduplomasi (Tripoli)

November 14 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Zohour (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

November 14 (2 strikes) in Sirte: Sirte (Sirte); Qasr Abu Hadi (Sirte)

November 15 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Ain Zara: Kahily Mosque (Tripoli); Tajoura: Goot Al Roman (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

November 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

November 20 (2 strikes) in Ain Zara: HappyLand Park (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli)

November 20 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

November 21 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

November 21 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

November 24 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)
• November 25 (1 strike) in Castelverde (Tripoli)

• November 26 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli)

• November 26 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• November 27 (1 strike) in El Feel oil field (Murzuq)

• November 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• November 28 (1 strike) in Umm Al Aranib: Al Kassara (Murzuq)

• November 28 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli); Al Karizma (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); 4th Brigade camp (Tripoli)

• November 29 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• November 29 (1 strike) in Kabaw (Nalut)

• November 29 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• November 29 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

• November 30 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• November 30 (1 strike) in Al Harsha (Zawiya)

• December 1 (4 strikes) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Al Toghar mosque (Tripoli); Al Sabaa (Tripoli)

• December 2 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• December 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• December 4 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• December 5 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• December 6 (2 strikes) in Tajoura: Goot Al Roman (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)
• December 6 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• December 7 (4 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli)

• December 13 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• December 13 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• December 15 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

• December 15 (2 strikes) in Misrata: Misrata (Misrata); Al Saket camp (Misrata)

• December 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• December 17 (1 strike) in Zliten Murqub

• December 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• December 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli)

• December 18 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• December 19 (4 strikes) in Misrata: Hittin battalion (Misrata); Misrata (Misrata); Air Defense camp (Misrata); Tamina (Misrata); Al Saket camp (Misrata)

• December 19 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• December 19 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• December 20 (7 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Al Falah road (Tripoli); Al Sabaa (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Janzur: Jabas gate (Tripoli)

• December 20 (1 strike) in Zliten (Murqub)

• December 20 (1 strike) in Sirte: Mashrou Al Abqr (Sirte)
December 21 (1 strike) in Msallata Murqub

December 22 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Al Baaysh (Tripoli)

December 23 (1 strike) in Msallata Murqub

December 23 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)

December 24 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Toghar mosque (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli)

December 25 (1 strike) in Msallata Murqub

December 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli)

December 26 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

December 26 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli)

December 27 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Tajoura: Al Na'am camp (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

December 27 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

December 28 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya)

December 29 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Bilash’har (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli)

December 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Wali Al Ahed street (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

December 31 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

2020

January 1 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- January 2 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Al Fornaj (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Jarabah street (Tripoli); Al Shok (Tripoli)

- January 2 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

- January 3 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Airport road (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Janzur: 7 April camp (Tripoli)

- January 4 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Daoua Al Islamiya (Tripoli); Sugar Hospital (Tripoli); Nawasi headquarters (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

- January 5 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Tajoura: Bi’r Al Austa Milad road (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

- January 7 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte)

- January 7 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

- January 8 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

- January 8 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli)

- January 9 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

- January 9 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

- January 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

- January 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Barika oil company (Tripoli)

- January 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

- January 18 (1 strike) in Zamzam (Jabal al Gharbi)

- January 18 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

- January 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Oil tanks (Tripoli)
• January 19 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• January 21 (1 strike) in Zamzam (Jabal al Gharbi)

• January 21 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• January 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• January 24 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• January 25 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Safwa Hospital (Tripoli); Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Arada (Tripoli)

• January 26 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• January 27 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

• January 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Rajab Al Naab school (Tripoli); average civilian death: 4; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 4; Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• February 1 (1 strike) in South of Misrata and Zliten (Misrata)

• February 1 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• February 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Sheibani street (Tripoli)

• February 4 (1 strike) in Zamzam (Jabal al Gharbi)

• February 4 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2; Al Shok (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

APPENDIX D: Egypt Strikes in Libya

2019

• February 2 (1 Strike) in Libya-Egypt Border 2019
APPENDIX E: Turkey Strikes in Libya

2019

• July 14 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Shell Khanoura Petrol Station (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• July 21 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• August 5 (1 strike) in Waddan-Anu Hadi Road (Sirte); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

• September 10 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

• September 13 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Sewehill (Tripoli)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Qashr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli)

• December 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

2020

• January 27 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

• January 27 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)

APPENDIX F: United Arab Emirates Strikes in Libya

2019

• September 19 (1 strike) in Murzuq: Al Qalaa (Murzuq); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

• September 21 (1 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• September 29 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Sa’adeh (Tripoli)

2020

• January 5 (1 strike) in Kabaw (Nalut)
APPENDIX G: United States Strikes in Libya

2018

- August 28 (1 strike) in Ban Walid (Misrata)
- November 29 (1 strike) in Al Uwaynat (Ghat)
- November 29 (1 strike) in Al Uwaynat (Murzuq)

2019

- February 13 (1 strike) in Ubari (Wadi al Hayaa)
- September 19 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)
- September 24 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq)
- September 26 (1 strike) in Sabha (Sabha)
- September 29 (1 strike) in Southern Libya
- September 30 (1 strike) in Umm Al Aranib (Murzuq)
- October 3 (1 strike) in Heg’ Hagel (Murzuq)

APPENDIX H: Unknown Belligerent Strikes in Libya

2018

- July 25 (1 strike) in Ubari (Wadi al Hayaa)
- August 7 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)
- August 10 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)
- December 13 (1 strike) in Wadi Jarif (Sirte)
- December 15 (1 strike) in Al Seddada (Misrata)

2019

- February 3 (1 strike) in Zliten (Murqub)
• March 4 (1 strike) in Brak (Wadi al Shatii)

• April 2 (1 strike) in Jebel Uweinat (Kufra); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 0; high civilian death: 4

• April 10 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• April 11 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli); average civilian death: 6.5; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 12

• April 13 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• April 16 (1 strike) in Janzur (Tripoli)

• April 19 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 21 (2 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 21 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• April 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

• April 26 (3 strikes) in Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)

• April 27 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

• April 29 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

• April 30 (1 strike) in Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli)

• May 1 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• May 1 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• May 2 (2 strikes) in Tajoura (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• May 3 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

• May 4 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)
May 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

May 4 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

May 8 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

May 8 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

May 14 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

May 15 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

May 15 (1 strike) in Al-Kasarat (Jafara)

May 17 (1 strike) in Sidi as Sa’is (Tripoli)

May 24 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

May 26 (1 strike) in Al Uqaylah (Al Wahat)

May 26 (1 strike) in Libyan-Egyptian border

May 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Alcerzama (Tripoli)

May 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Alnaqlya (Tripoli)

June 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Banana project (Tripoli)

June 21 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)

June 21 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

June 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

July 14 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

July 15 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli)

July 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tripoli: Al Ramla (Tripoli)

July 18 (1 strike) in Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli)

July 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli)
- July 29 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Tajoura (Tripoli)
- July 31 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)
- August 1 (1 strike) in Bani Walid (Misrata)
- August 1 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- August 5 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)
- August 6 (1 strike) in Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- August 25 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)
- August 26 (1 strike) in Kalipa (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- August 26 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- August 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)
- August 29 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)
- August 29 (1 strike) in Wadi al Ahmar (Sirte)
- August 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)
- September 2 (2 strikes) in Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli); Al Batata (Tripoli)
- September 6 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)
- September 7 (2 strikes) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli)
- September 7 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)
- September 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)
- September 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)
- September 10 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)
• September 13 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Waha paint factory; Sewehli (Tripoli); Tajoura: Zatarna (Tripoli)

• September 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• September 17 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 17 (1 strike) in Zuwara (Nuqat al Khums)

• September 19 (1 strike) in Benghazi (Benghazi); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• September 23 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Souq Al Sabet (Tripoli); Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• September 27 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Sabaa (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• October 1 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Ghararat (Tripoli); Yarmouk (Tripoli)

• October 2 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• October 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• October 9 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: 108 buildings (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3; Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli)

• October 10 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• October 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• October 12 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Damascus (Tripoli); Janzur: Al-Zahra bridge (Tripoli); Al-Swani (Tripoli); Tripoli: Al Sa’adeh (Tripoli)

• October 15 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli); Janzur: Al Matabat (Tripoli)
• October 17 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 17 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

• October 19 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

• October 19 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• October 20 (1 strike) in Khela Ben Oun: Hamza camp (Tripoli)

• October 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Fatih University (Tripoli)

• October 23 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Qusour Al Diyafa (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furja (Tripoli); Tripoli: Al Hadba (Tripoli)

• October 24 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

• October 25 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Furusiya (Tripoli); Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli); Tripoli: Asfah Road (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Yarmouk camp (Tripoli)

• October 27 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Al Fatih University (Tripoli)

• October 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli)

• October 29 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Zohour (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• October 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Shok (Tripoli)

• November 1 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• November 4 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Nasser University (Tripoli)

• November 5 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• November 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)
November 9 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir: Al Ramla (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

November 10 (4 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli); Al Tekbali camp (Tripoli); Sidra street (Tripoli)

November 11 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

November 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

November 13 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Shok (Tripoli)

November 14 (3 strikes) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Ben Ashour (Tripoli); Al Fatih University (Tripoli)

November 18 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); Khela Ben Oun (Tripoli)

November 19 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli); Al Shok (Tripoli)

November 20 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

November 26 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli)

November 28 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Toghar mosque (Tripoli)

November 28 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Tripoli: Sidra street (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Almalja (Tripoli); Tripoli: Sidra street (Tripoli)

November 29 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

November 30 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

November 30 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Sa’adeh (Tripoli); Janzur (Tripoli); Al Toghar mosque (Tripoli)

December 3 (4 strikes) in Al-Swani (Tripoli); Hai Alsslam (Tripoli); Tripoli (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)
December 4 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Al Zohour (Tripoli)

December 5 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

December 5 (1 strike) in Aziziya (Jafara)

December 6 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Zohour (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Khallet Al Furjan (Tripoli)

December 6 (1 strike) in Ghiran (Misrata)

December 7 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

December 8 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli; Airport road (Tripoli)

December 9 (1 strike) in Sirte: Ghardabya Air base (Sirte)

December 10 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Souq Al Ahed (Tripoli)

December 12 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Saleh village (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

December 13 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

December 14 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

December 15 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Imdad camp (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

December 15 (1 strike) in Misrata: Hittin battalion (Misrata)

December 17 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

December 18 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Furusiya bridge (Tripoli); Al Serraj (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

December 19 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

December 20 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Al Hadaba Al Badri (Tripoli); Al Daoua Al Islamiya (Tripoli)
• December 21 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• December 24 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Abu Salim (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

• December 25 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli); Nasser University (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• December 26 (5 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli); Al Serraj (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Zawiya (Zawiya)

• December 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Fatih University (Tripoli)

• December 31 (1 strike) in Qasr Abu Hadi (Sirte); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

2020

• January 2 (2 strikes) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); Nasser University (Tripoli)

• January 3 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

• January 4 (1 strike) in Qasr Abu Hadi (Sirte)

• January 4 (4 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Sa'adeh (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli)

• January 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Tripoli: Al Shok (Tripoli)

• January 6 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ministry of Culture (Tripoli)

• January 6 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• January 7 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Fornaj (Tripoli); Al Shok (Tripoli)

• January 8 (6 strikes) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Ain Zara (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli); Banana project (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)

• January 9 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Al-Wushka (Sirte); average civilian death 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2; Al Shok (Tripoli); Hadaba project (Tripoli)
January 20 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli)

January 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

January 25 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Alim (Tripoli)

January 26 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Airport road (Tripoli)

January 27 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli)

January 28 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Al Daoua Al Islamiya (Tripoli); Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli)

January 29 (3 strikes) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli); Janzur: 7 April camp (Tripoli); Salaheddin (Tripoli)

January 29 (1 strike) in Abugrein (Misrata)

January 29 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Fatih University (Tripoli)

February 2 (2 strikes) in Ain Zara (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

February 4 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli)

February 5 (2 strikes) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli)

APPENDIX I: Contested Belligerent Strikes in Libya

2018

August 4 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)

August 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)

August 28 (1 strike) in Bani Walid Misrata

August 28 (1 strike) in Tajoura (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

August 29 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)
- August 30 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Mashtal (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

- August 31 (2 strikes) in Tripoli (Tripoli); Al Wadan hotel (Tripoli)

- September 2 (1 strike) in: Al Falah (Tripoli) 3 average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 4

- September 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli)

- September 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- September 20 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli); average civilian death 6; low civilian death: 6; high civilian death: 6

- September 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli)

- September 26 (1 strike) in Ubari (Wadi al Hayaa)

- October 1 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

2019

- April 19 (2 strike) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir Tripoli; average civilian death 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1; Qasr Bin Gashir: Tahrer School (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- April 20 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- April 23 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport road (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

- April 23 (1 strike) in Wadi al Hira (Jafara)

- April 29 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

- May 3 (1 strike) in Janzur: Al Keramia (Tripoli)

- July 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Souq Al Jumaa (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3
July 27 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadaba Al Badri (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3

August 7 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

August 11 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

September 8 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

September 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)

September 12 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

September 13 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah Jabal al Gharbi

October 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Sa’adeh (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

October 16 (1 strike) in Ain Zara (Tripoli)

October 17 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3

October 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

APPENDIX J: Joint GNA/Italy Strikes in Libya

2018

August 29 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Marqub); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

APPENDIX K: Multiple Actors/Unidentified LNA/GNA Strikes in Libya

2019

April 7 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

April 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli Khallet Al Fur January (Tripoli); Average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- April 10 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- April 24 (1 strike) in Tripoli (Tripoli)
- April 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadba (Tripoli)
- May 1 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli)
- May 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al-Swani (Tripoli)
- May 24 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Abu Salim (Tripoli)
- June 20 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)
- June 26 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Wadi al Rabie (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3
- September 12 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- October 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli)
- October 17 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Bi’r Altota (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 3
- October 29 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli)
- November 4 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Shok (Tripoli)
- November 9 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Airport Road (Tripoli)
- November 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project; average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- December 16 (1 strike) in in Tripoli: Hadaba project; average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
- December 18 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli)
- December 25 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Qasr Bin Gashir (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

2020

- January 2 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Ben Ashour (Tripoli)
Jan 3 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Arada (Tripoli)

Jan 5 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Al Hadaba Al Badri (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

Jan 8 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Hadaba project (Tripoli)

APPENDIX L: GNA/Turkey Strikes in Libya

2019

July 26 (1 strike) in Jufra air base (Jufra)

Aug 27 (1 strike) in Asabi’ah (Jabal al Gharbi); average civilian death: 5; low civilian death: 4; high civilian death: 6

Sept 5 (1 strike) in Tarhuna (Murqub)

Sept 6 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Sog Al-Khmies Emsihel (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

Oct 16 in Tripoli: Ain Zara (Tripoli): Ain Zara Tripoli; average civilian death: 6; low civilian death: 6; high civilian death: 6

2020

Jan 5 (1 strike) in Al Watiyah (Nalut); average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

Jan 7 (1 strike) in Al-Wushka (Sirte); average civilian death: 10.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 18

APPENDIX M: LNA/UAE Strikes in Libya

2019

July 3 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Detention Center (Tripoli); average civilian death: 66.5; low civilian death: 53; high civilian death: 80
• July 22 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• July 26 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• August 4 (1 strike) in Murzuq (Murzuq); average civilian death: 43.5; low civilian death: 42; high civilian death: 45

• August 6 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• August 24 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli); average civilian death 3.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 4

• August 26 (1 strike) in Gheryan (Jabal al Gharbi)

• September 9 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• September 10 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

• September 14 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• September 15 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• September 16 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Mitiga International Airport (Tripoli)

• September 19 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

• September 21 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Khallet Al Fur January (Tripoli)

• September 29 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• September 30 (1 strike) in Sirte: River project (Sirte)

• October 1 (1 strike) in Sirte: River project (Sirte)

• October 5 (1 strike) in Misrata Airport (Misrata)

• October 6 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

• October 7 (1 strike) in Qasr Bin Gashir: Altwaisha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

• October 24 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Salaheddin (Tripoli); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1
November 5 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

November 18 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Sunbulah biscuit factory (Tripoli); average civilian death: 8.5; low civilian death: 7; high civilian death: 10

November 18 (1 strike) in Misrata: Al Ruwaisat (Misrata); average civilian death: 8.5; low civilian death: 6; high civilian death: 11

November 28 (1 strike) in Umm Al Aranib: Chinese company (Murzuq) average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

December 1 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte); average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: average civilian death 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 5

December 1 (1 strike) in Al-Swani (Tripoli)

December 17 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)

December 19 (1 strike) in Misrata (Misrata)

December 20 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte); average civilian death 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

December 20 (1 strike) in Msallata (Murqub)

December 21 (1 strike) in Zliten (Murqub)

December 21 (1 strike) in Zliten (Murqub); average civilian death: 3.5; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 4

December 24 (1 strike) in Tajoura: Bi’r Al Austa Milad road (Tripoli); average civilian death: 2; low civilian death: 2; high civilian death: 2

December 26 (1 strike) in Zawiya (Zawiya); average civilian death: 1; low civilian death: 1; high civilian death: 1

December 29 (1 strike) in Tripoli: Shurfat Al Malaha (Tripoli); average civilian death: 3; low civilian death: 3; high civilian death: 3

2020

January 1 (1 strike) in Al-Swani: Al Kanisa street (Tripoli)

January 3 (1 strike) in Sirte (Sirte)
APPENDIX N: Joint LNA/France Strikes in Libya

2018

• August 4 (1 strike) in Derna (Derna)


airstrikes-and-civilian-casualties-libya/the-us-counterterrorism-war-and-libya/


56 “Source: Air Force Targeted The Chadian Opposition Militants In Murzuq.” Libya News 24, 5 Aug. 2019, archive.is/tH8Fc#selection-2487.133-2487.179


68 Some allegations of strikes or civilian casualties are attributed to more than one belligerent, which could mean that a plane was misidentified or that a strike was conducted jointly by, say, both LNA and GNA warplanes, accounting for higher strike and casualty numbers on both sides.


71 “Libya Facing ‘Serious Crisis’ Fueled by Outsiders Bent on Dividing the County, UN Assembly Told | UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, September 104


96 Mikail, Barah. “From Gaddafi to Haftar: France Plays Both Sides in Libya.” Middle East Eye, June 11,


The LNA has primarily struck Tripoli since June 2018 through February 2020. The strike count is at least 678, with an additional 20 strikes likely in coordination with the UAE. The 678 strikes account for 75 percent of the LNA's strikes throughout this period.


145 New America tracks U.S. drone strikes and other operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Our data can be accessed here: https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/


153 Sigonella in Sicily, Italy is the military base from which the U.S. launches drones to North Africa.


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